Michael Strausbaugh v. Greentree Servicing LLC by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-25-2021 
Michael Strausbaugh v. Greentree Servicing LLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"Michael Strausbaugh v. Greentree Servicing LLC" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 466. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/466 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











GREENTREE SERVICING LLC; KML LAW GROUP PC; JILL P. JENKINS, Pa. ID 
# 306588; DAVID FEIN, Pa. ID # 82628; JAMES ANTHONY; LORI HOGUE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-01433) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 9, 2021 
 
Before:  MCKEE, SHWARTZ and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 







* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





Michael Strausbaugh appeals pro se from the orders of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his second amended complaint 
and denying his motion to alter or amend that dismissal order.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm those orders. 
I. 
Strausbaugh is a federal prisoner who is serving a 45-year prison sentence 
imposed in 2012.  That year, Green Tree Servicing LLC (“Green Tree”)1 initiated 
mortgage foreclosure proceedings against Strausbaugh in Pennsylvania state court, 
seeking to foreclose on his residence in New Oxford, Pennsylvania.  Those foreclosure 
proceedings resulted in the property being sold at a sheriff’s sale in 2013.     
In 2015, at which point Strausbaugh was incarcerated at a federal prison in 
Arizona, he filed a pro se civil complaint in the United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona (“the DAZ”).  The complaint, which raised both federal-constitutional 
and state-law claims related to the foreclosure action, was brought against Green Tree, 
the law firm that had represented Green Tree in the foreclosure action (KML Law Group, 
P.C.), two attorneys from that law firm (David Fein and Jill Jenkins), the process server 
who had served the mortgage-foreclosure complaint (James Anthony), the deputy 
prothonotary of the Pennsylvania state court in which the foreclosure action had been 
filed (Lori Hogue), and the attorney who had represented Strausbaugh in his federal 
 
1 Although Green Tree is now known as Ditech Financial LLC, we will use its 
former name in this opinion. 
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criminal case (James West).  Strausbaugh asserted that this complaint was properly 
before the DAZ pursuant to that court’s diversity jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
The DAZ, concluding that venue was not proper in that district, transferred the 
complaint to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(“the District Court”).  The District Court then referred the complaint to a Magistrate 
Judge, who screened it and recommended that it be dismissed.  In making that 
recommendation, the Magistrate Judge began by determining that diversity jurisdiction 
was lacking because Strausbaugh was a Pennsylvania citizen (notwithstanding his 
incarceration in Arizona) and some of the defendants were Pennsylvania citizens, too.  
The Magistrate Judge then explained that there was federal-question jurisdiction in this 
case because the complaint raised constitutional claims.  However, the Magistrate Judge 
concluded that those constitutional claims failed to state a viable cause of action for 
various reasons.  And since those claims were subject to dismissal, the Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the District Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the pendent state-law claims.  The Magistrate Judge concluded that amendment of 
Strausbaugh’s complaint would be futile, so she recommended that the District Court 
dismiss the case with prejudice. 
Strausbaugh objected to the Magistrate Judge’s report, asserting, inter alia, that he 
should be given an opportunity to rebut the presumption that he was still a Pennsylvania 
citizen when he commenced this action.  The District Court agreed with Strausbaugh on 
this point, declined to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, and granted 
Strausbaugh leave to file an amended complaint.  A few weeks later, Strausbaugh filed 
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his amended complaint.  And about a year after that, he filed a proposed second amended 
complaint (“the SAC”), claiming that he had forgotten to include certain factual 
allegations in his first amended complaint.  The Magistrate Judge granted Strausbaugh’s 
request for permission to file the SAC.  That pleading, which is 68 pages long, alleged 
claims against all of the original defendants except West (Strausbaugh’s former attorney), 
and it included allegations suggesting that Strausbaugh no longer had ties to 
Pennsylvania. 
All but one of the defendants named in the SAC eventually moved to dismiss that 
pleading.2  The Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court grant those 
motions and dismiss the case in its entirety without affording Strausbaugh further leave to 
amend.  As she had done before, the Magistrate Judge concluded that (1) diversity 
jurisdiction was lacking, (2) none of Strausbaugh’s constitutional claims raised a viable 
cause of action, (3) it was appropriate for the District Court to abstain from exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state-law claims, and (4) amendment would be 
futile.  On the issue of diversity jurisdiction, the Magistrate Judge explained that 
Strausbaugh had not rebutted the presumption that he was still a citizen of Pennsylvania, 
for the SAC “fail[ed] to allege any contacts with Arizona besides being incarcerated 
there, or otherwise indicate that he intends to reside in Arizona, as opposed to some other 
state, upon his release.”  (Mag. J. Report entered Aug. 6, 2018, at 10.) 
 




 On September 28, 2018, the District Court overruled Strausbaugh’s objections to 
the Magistrate Judge’s new report, adopted that report, and dismissed the case in its 
entirety with prejudice.  Thereafter, Strausbaugh timely moved to alter or amend that 
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).  The District Court denied 
that motion on January 15, 2019.  Strausbaugh then timely filed this appeal, challenging 
both the September 28, 2018 and January 15, 2019 orders. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing the SAC.  See In re Schering 
Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012).  
We review the District Court’s order denying Strausbaugh’s Rule 59(e) motion for abuse 
of discretion, except with respect to matters of law, over which our review is plenary.  
See Addie v. Kjaer, 737 F.3d 854, 867 (3d Cir. 2013). 
III. 
 We begin our review with the SAC’s two constitutional claims, both of which 
were brought solely against Hogue (the deputy prothonotary).  Specifically, Strausbaugh 
claimed that Hogue violated his First Amendment right of access to the courts and his 
Fifth Amendment right to due process of law by failing to (1) send him a copy of the case 
file for the foreclosure action after his family paid for that copy, and (2) docket two 
record-related motions that he submitted in connection with that action.3  We see no 
 




reason to disturb the District Court’s dismissal of these claims.  The First Amendment 
claim fails because Strausbaugh did not present any non-conclusory allegations 
demonstrating that any failure to act on Hogue’s part reflected an intentional effort to 
deprive Strausbaugh of his right to access the courts.  See, e.g., Simkins v. Bruce, 406 
F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen access to courts is impeded by mere 
negligence, . . . no constitutional violation occurs.”); Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 291 
n.11 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“[W]e have made clear that an allegation of simple 
negligence will not support a claim that an official has denied an individual . . . access to 
the courts.”); see also Edinboro Coll. Park Apartments v. Edinboro Univ. Found., 850 
F.3d 567, 572 (3d Cir. 2017) (“In evaluating the sufficiency of the allegations, we 
disregard rote recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere 
conclusory statements.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Meanwhile, the Fifth 
Amendment claim fails because Hogue is not a federal actor.  See Brown v. Philip Morris 
Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2001).4  And we see no error in the District Court’s 




4 To the extent that Strausbaugh’s Fifth Amendment claim could liberally be 
construed as alleging a violation of his substantive and/or procedural due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, we conclude that, for substantially the reasons 
provided by the Magistrate Judge in her second report (which the District Court adopted), 
Strausbaugh failed to state a viable Fourteenth Amendment claim against Hogue.  (See 




 Because Strausbaugh’s constitutional claims were subject to dismissal, it was 
appropriate for the District Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his 
state-law claims.  See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000).  Accordingly, 
he could proceed with those state-law claims in federal court only if there is diversity 
jurisdiction in this case.  We now turn to that issue. 
 For diversity jurisdiction to lie, the plaintiff cannot, at the time the action is filed, 
be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants.  See Johnson v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 346 (3d Cir. 2013).5  “The citizenship of a natural person 
is the state where that person is domiciled,” GBForefront, L.P. v. Forefront Mgmt. Grp., 
LLC, 888 F.3d 29, 34 (3d Cir. 2018), which “is established by an objective physical 
presence in the state . . . coupled with a subjective intention to remain there indefinitely,” 
Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).  “The 
party asserting diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of proof,” and he “generally meets 
this burden by proving diversity of citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence.”  
McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Tr., 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006).   
Strausbaugh does not dispute that, before his incarceration, he was a citizen of 
Pennsylvania.  The critical question here is whether he was still a Pennsylvania citizen 
(and, thus, he had not become an Arizona citizen) when he commenced this action while 
incarcerated in an Arizona federal prison.  “Prisoners presumptively retain their prior 
 
5 Additionally, the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000, exclusive of 
interest and costs.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  That requirement is not in dispute here.  
(See Second Am. Compl. 67 (seeking $500,000 in compensatory damages).) 
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citizenship when the [prison] gates close behind them.”  Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 
704 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2013).  Courts have held that this presumption may be 
“rebutted by a prisoner who . . .  show[s] facts sufficient to indicate a bona fide intention 
to change his domicile to the place of his incarceration.”  Jones v. Hadican, 552 F.2d 249, 
251 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); see Hall v. Curran, 599 F.3d 70, 72 (1st Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam).  To rebut the presumption, “the prisoner must offer more than conclusory 
statements and unsupported allegations.”  Hall, 599 F.3d at 72.  “Factors to be weighed in 
determining domicile include the prisoner’s declaration of intentions, ‘the possibility of 
parole . . ., the manner in which [he] has ordered his personal and business transactions, 
and any other factors that are relevant to corroboration of [the prisoner’s] statements.’”  
Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2006) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1126-27 (6th Cir. 1973)). 
 Here, the District Court did not err in concluding that Strausbaugh had failed to 
rebut the presumption that he was still a citizen of Pennsylvania when he commenced this 
civil action.  The SAC did not contain any allegations indicating that he intended to 
remain in Arizona indefinitely after he completed his lengthy prison sentence.6  Although 
his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s second report contained additional allegations on 
the citizenship issue, we cannot conclude that those allegations were sufficient to rebut 
the presumption, particularly given that his projected release date from prison was (and 
 





still is) decades away and his son was still living in Pennsylvania.  See also Jones, 552 
F.2d at 251 (indicating that “truly exceptional circumstances” are needed to rebut the 
presumption).7  Nor can we conclude that the District Court erred by not affording 
Strausbaugh another opportunity to amend his allegations of citizenship.8 
 Because Strausbaugh, like some of the defendants, was a Pennsylvania citizen 
when he commenced this action, the District Court correctly concluded that diversity 
jurisdiction does not lie in this case.  See Johnson, 724 F.3d at 346.  Accordingly, it was 
 
7 Specifically, Strausbaugh alleged that (1) “[he] intends to remain in Arizona 
indefinitely after release, and [he] has intended such since 2013”; (2) “[t]he Federal 
Bureau of Prisons lists [his] release address as Prescott, Arizona[,] where he intends to 
reside upon release”; (3) “[u]pon release from prison, [he] intends to start a business or 
obtain a job in Arizona and pay taxes in that state”; (4) “[he] intends to establish bank 
accounts in Arizona upon release”; and (5) “[he] intends to purchase a vehicle and have it 
registered in Arizona upon release.”  (Strausbaugh’s App. at 106.)  Strausbaugh also 
indicated that his prison “release contact” is a cousin who lives in Arizona.  But most of 
these allegations are simply too vague or conclusory, and we are not persuaded that the 
allegations about Strausbaugh’s “release address” and “release contact” are weighty 
enough to tip the scales in his favor. 
 
8 “Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the . . . 
appellate courts.”  28 U.S.C. § 1653; see Kiser v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 831 F.2d 423, 427 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (explaining that § 1653 “permits amendments broadly so as to avoid dismissal 
of diversity suits on technical grounds”).  In advance of briefing, the Clerk directed 
Strausbaugh to “identify any additional allegations that he believes would support his 
contention that he is a citizen of Arizona.”  (Clerk Order entered Feb. 20, 2020.)  
Strausbaugh responded by providing the following additional allegations:  (1) “he prefers 
the . . . sunny and warm winter weather in Arizona over that of Pennsylvania”; (2) “he 
plans to capitalize on Arizona’s large off-roading industry with his knowledge in 
automotive performance”; and (3) “he believes that Arizona is far enough away from 
Pennsylvania for him to be free from public scorn and hostility based on his crime of 
conviction.”  (Strausbaugh’s Opening Br. 3C-3D.)  Having considered these additional 
allegations, we are still not persuaded that Strausbaugh has done enough to rebut the 
presumption and establish that, when he commenced this action in 2015, he intended to 




appropriate for the District Court to dismiss all of Strausbaugh’s state-law claims for lack 
of jurisdiction.  And since both those claims and Strausbaugh’s constitutional claims 
were properly dismissed, there is no reason for us to disturb either the District Court’s 
dismissal order or its subsequent order denying his Rule 59(e) motion.9 
 In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s September 28, 2018 and 
January 15, 2019 orders. 
 
9 Strausbaugh argues that, if he was indeed still a Pennsylvania citizen when he 
commenced this action, the District Court should have dismissed only the diversity-
destroying defendants (KML Law Group, its two attorneys, and Hogue), not the entire 
case.  “[I]t is well settled that [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21] invests district courts 
with authority to allow a dispensable[,] nondiverse party to be dropped at any time . . . .”  
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832 (1989) (emphasis added)).  
However, as explained below, even if Strausbaugh could establish that each of the 
diversity-destroying defendants in this case were dispensable, see Zambelli Fireworks 
Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 421 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing how to determine 
whether a party is indispensable), there would be no reason for us to remand this case to 
the District Court for further proceedings. 
 
If all of the diversity-destroying defendants were dismissed, the only remaining 
defendant would be Green Tree (recall that Anthony (the process server) was never 
served).  In October 2020, Strausbaugh filed in this Court a one-page document titled 
“Notice of Intent to Withdraw Monetary Claims against Appellee Greentree Servicing 
LLC.”  Therein, he indicated that, in view of a recent injunction entered in a bankruptcy 
proceeding involving Green Tree, he no longer intends to pursue his claims for 
compensatory and punitive damages against Green Tree.  Although Strausbaugh noted 
that he “will continue to seek . . . [the] reversal of the state court judgment,” we agree 
with Green Tree that he cannot pursue that claim in federal court because it is barred by 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 
U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  In short, because Strausbaugh presently has no claim that he can 
pursue against Green Tree in federal court, nothing would be gained by remanding this 
case.  
